Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP | Ezra Zahabi, Daniel Quinn, Ian Meade, Tim Pearce, Hamish Annandale, Simon Ellis, Qasam Mahmood, Suley Siddiqui, Eduardo Rodriguez and Michael Carr
European Union | United Kingdom
1. FCA Multi-Firm Review: Conflicts of Interest and Fair Customer Treatment in Private Markets
The Financial Conduct Authority (the “FCA”)’s report on its multi-firm review of conflicts of interest and fair customer treatment in private markets, published on 23 October 2026, sets out how firms identify, manage, mitigate and disclose conflicts of interest.1
The review covered firms managing funds or providing portfolio management and/or advisory services in the UK in private equity, private credit and real estate assets. However, the FCA notes that many of its observations may also be relevant to other areas of private markets.
The review was conducted in two phases: a questionnaire to a broad sample of firms, followed by on-site visits to a selected group to test how arrangements operated in practice.
The FCA’s central message is that conflicts management must reflect the firm’s business. While many firms demonstrated effective governance and a clear focus on investor outcomes, standards varied considerably, and conflicts frameworks did not always evolve as firms grew and their business models, structures and products became more complex. For the FCA, firms should assess whether their frameworks reflect the substance of their UK activities, how conflicts are identified, escalated and overseen, as well as their approach to cross-fund and continuation transactions, gifts and entertainment, information barriers, and the role of investor consultation and disclosure.
The FCA also identified recurring weaknesses in three areas: (i) cross-fund transfers and continuation transactions, (ii) gifts and entertainment, and (iii) information barriers.
Key Takeaways
The findings fall under three major themes.
1. Governance and Oversight
- Complexity and proportionality. The FCA found a clear link between the complexity of a firm’s business model and the level of inherent conflicts risk arising across its operations. Firms with focused models (e.g., a single asset class, clear separation between strategies, or no involvement of group affiliates in lending and investment) avoided larger private markets conflicts. Firms operating across multiple asset classes, strategies or fund structures, or alongside group affiliates, generally faced a broader range of conflicts, requiring enhanced oversight. However, the firms with the greatest inherent risk were not always the most effective at managing it, and some firms with more complex models did not operate proportionately enhanced controls.
- Substance over form. Some firms characterised their UK activities as advisory only, because formal investment decisions were taken by overseas entities, and scoped their UK conflicts frameworks narrowly, often focusing primarily on personal conflicts. Yet UK-based staff were frequently involved in significant parts of the investment lifecycle, including activities that could create significant conflicts of interest. Whilst the FCA recognises that such business models, operating arrangements or ownership structures may be legitimate, it expects firms to design a conflicts framework that reflects the substance of their UK activities and the conflicts arising from them.
- Identification. Better-practice firms identified conflicts at both business-model and transaction level, ran wide-ranging checks as soon as a transaction was first proposed and set triggers for reassessment through due diligence, structuring, allocation, valuation and exit.
- Internal conflicts documentation. All firms maintained a conflicts register, but best-practice firms supplemented it with a more comprehensive framework and specific procedures for areas such as investment opportunity allocation, transfer of investment positions between investment pools, personal account dealing, and gifts and hospitality. The FCA recognised that the sophistication of systems will depend on a firm’s size and complexity.
- Oversight and escalation. The strongest firms had a committee responsible for reviewing the effectiveness of conflicts arrangements, pre-set escalation triggers and the ability to meet ad hoc for non-standard or material events. In international groups, better frameworks operated conflicts governance at both UK and group level.
- Limited Partner Advisory Committees (LPACs). The FCA observed that LPACs are not always an effective conflicts management tool. Informed investor consent can be valuable, but firms should not rely on consulting a subset of investors as the primary means of managing material conflicts.
Governance arrangements should be proportionate to the nature, scale, substance and complexity of a firm’s activities. Escalation thresholds, accountable owners and decision-makers should be clearly defined for material or complex conflicts, and the conflicts framework should be subject to strong second-line oversight and periodic third-line assurance.
2. Personal Conflicts
- Personal account dealing. All firms required pre-approval for personal account dealing, and most also used regular reviews, broker account declarations and post-trade monitoring. The FCA noted that in private markets, personal interests may arise in portfolio companies or their stakeholders, co-investment opportunities, sponsors or counterparties.
- Gifts and entertainment. This was one of the FCA’s areas of focus. All firms had policies, approval thresholds and reporting arrangements with respect to gifts and entertainment, but the issue was whether firms could demonstrate that these operated effectively in practice. In some cases, the value and nature of gifts and entertainment exceeded what the FCA typically sees in public markets, and the FCA expects firms to be able to justify this. Good practice included registers recording the business purpose, basis of valuation, conflict and inducement considerations and rationale for approvals.
- Gifts and entertainment to third parties. Firms generally maintained gifts and entertainment registers which recorded gifts and hospitality given to third parties, detailing value, recipient, business purpose and approval status. The strongest arrangements supplemented this with compliance oversight and documented justifications for providing hospitality. However, the FCA noted that registers did not always document the specific conflicts considered, the rationale for concluding that they had been appropriately managed, or how the information supported ongoing monitoring and challenge.
Firms should maintain gifts and entertainment frameworks that are proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of their business, and the FCA expects firms to demonstrate that controls are not only documented in policies and procedures but are operating effectively in practice.
3. Conflicts Across the Investment Lifecycle
- Origination. Stronger firms screened for conflicts at the earliest stage, often involving legal and compliance before non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) were signed. Weaker firms did not consistently assess conflicts before NDAs were signed and involved legal and compliance late or retrospectively.
- Information barriers. Best arrangements combined physical, organisational and system-based separation with active compliance monitoring, restrictions on sharing NDA information and chaperones for discussions at risk of crossing barriers.
- Allocation. Firms with stronger approaches had documented allocation frameworks with predefined criteria and pro rata methodologies for oversubscribed deals, supported by a documented rationale on investor fairness and, in several cases, dedicated allocation committees and periodic reviews of outcomes.
- Connected and multi-party transactions. These include transactions where decisions may favour one party over another (e.g., multiple funds, investor groups or affiliated parties whose interests may not align). The FCA noted that valuation conflicts can be particularly acute where firms have discretion over the valuation of assets. Firms with stronger practices subjected these transactions to enhanced governance beyond business-as-usual approvals, used separate decision-making teams for competing investor interests and escalated end-of-fund situations (e.g., extensions, liquidations, secondaries and distressed scenarios) to bodies such as LPACs. To note, the FCA saw limited evidence that relying on a third-party valuation as the primary mitigant would manage the conflict effectively where decision-making was not clearly separated.
- Cross-fund transactions and continuation vehicles. With the firm on both sides, one set of investors may be disadvantaged on price, timing or transfer terms. Better approaches treated these as elevated-risk events, with independent valuations (in one case, separate valuations for buy-side and sell-side funds), independent challenge, clear segregation of buy-side and sell-side decision-makers and LPAC consent or timely disclosure. Weaker firms relied on existing governance, disclosure or investor consent without substantive independent challenge, often using the same valuation and the same committee, albeit in separate sittings, for both sides.
- Investor alignment and side letters. Some firms evidenced alignment through meaningful GP commitments alongside investors’ money and governance over fees, expenses, fundraising and deployment pressures. Good-practice firms treated most-favoured-nation (MFN) clauses and side letters as part of their investor-fairness framework, under legal and compliance oversight.
- Disclosures. Disclosures should be a supplementary control, not a substitute for conflicts management.
Across the investment lifecycle, the FCA expects firms to be able to demonstrate that they identify conflicts early enough to influence decisions, subject them to effective oversight, escalation and independent challenge, evidence how investor fairness was considered in conflicted decisions, and evolve their frameworks as their business grows.
Next Steps:
- The FCA will carry out targeted follow-up work where appropriate and continue to engage with firms and industry bodies on the findings from the review.
- Firms should review their conflicts frameworks, policies and governance arrangements in light of the FCA’s findings and consider whether enhancements are required.
2. Solo-Regulated Firms’ Remuneration Rules Reform
The FCA’s Consultation Paper CP26/27, “Remuneration: Solo-regulated firms’ rules reform” (“CP26/27”),2 closed on 16 September 2026.
CP26/27 proposes to replace the AIFM Remuneration Code (SYSC 19B), the UCITS Remuneration Code (SYSC 19E) and the MIFIDPRU Remuneration Code (SYSC 19G) with a single, proportionate, outcomes-focused remuneration code for “solo-regulated firms”3 to be set out in a new SYSC 19AA (the “New Code”).
To remove duplication, improve clarity and reduce complexity for in-scope firms, the FCA proposes to consolidate the rules under the New Code, which would apply to: (i) full-scope UK alternative investment fund managers (“AIFMs”); (ii) UK UCITS management companies that manage a UCITS scheme; and (iii) MIFIDPRU investment firms that are not small and non-interconnected (“SNI”) firms (“non-SNI firms”). SNI firms, on the other hand, would be excluded entirely from the regime.
Additionally, the FCA does not intend to replicate the current tiered regime under the MIFIDPRU Remuneration Code (i.e., basic, standard and extended requirements based on thresholds and firm characteristics), meaning that all firms within the scope of the New Code would be subject to the same requirements, regardless of size. For AIFMs, scope would move from full-scope UK AIFMs to medium and large UK AIFMs once the reforms proposed in CP26/28, “The UK AIFM Regime”, take effect.4
Nonetheless, remuneration policies and practices must remain appropriate for, and proportionate to, the nature, scale and complexity of the firm’s business. Firms that are compliant with the existing rules should generally remain compliant under the New Code and need not redesign their full suite of remuneration arrangements solely because of the reforms.
The New Code would operate at two levels: (i) general requirements applying to all staff (broadly defined to include employees, partners or members, secondees and group employees providing services to the firm); and (ii) additional “solo-remuneration principles” applying to material risk takers (“MRTs”). For these purposes, remuneration would expressly include carried interest paid by an alternative investment fund (“AIF”) and performance fees paid by a UCITS scheme for the benefit of an MRT.
Key Takeaways from CP26/27:
1. New, narrower definition of MRTs: The FCA proposes to narrow the definition of MRTs so that a firm’s MRTs are limited to staff members whose activities or remuneration incentives have a material impact on (i) the firm’s conduct in relation to its clients and investors; (ii) the interests of the investors, the AIFs and the UCITS schemes; or (iii) the firm’s compliance with regulatory obligations. Firms should focus on the substance of the role and its incentives rather than on job title or seniority. Draft guidance gives indicative examples, such as authority over decisions materially affecting investor outcomes, responsibility for significant revenue or assets under management or for key strategic decisions, and the ability to influence product design, approval or distribution in a way that may cause material harm (proposed SYSC 19AA.3.3G). Individuals currently certified solely as MRTs would no longer need annual certification if they fall outside the narrower definition, unless they perform another certification function under the Senior Managers and Certification Regime. The FCA’s Certification Regime is also under review and could be reformed in the near future.
2. Solo-remuneration principles for MRTs: Six principles would apply to MRTs (proposed SYSC 19AA.4 to SYSC 19AA.9).
-
- Remuneration Principle 1: Fixed and variable components of remuneration – As under the current regime, a firm must ensure that its remuneration policies and practices in relation to its MRTs make a clear distinction between fixed and variable remuneration, with the fixed component sufficiently high to allow variable remuneration to be reduced or not paid where appropriate. However, the New Code does not prescribe the composition of the variable remuneration paid to an MRT (currently, a firm must ensure that at least 50% of the variable remuneration paid to an MRT in relation to a performance period consists of certain “eligible instruments” set out in SYSC 19G.6.19R).
- Remuneration Principle 2: Assessment of performance – Where remuneration is performance-related, a firm must ensure that the assessment of an MRT’s performance reflects both financial and non-financial criteria.
- Remuneration Principle 3: Guaranteed variable remuneration – A firm may award, pay or provide guaranteed variable remuneration to an MRT only where the following conditions are met: (i) is made in the context of hiring a new MRT or compensating them for remuneration forfeited on leaving their previous employment; (ii) is time-limited and does not create an ongoing entitlement to guaranteed variable remuneration; and (iii) is subject to appropriate adjustment, reduction or recovery under the firm’s remuneration policies and practices, including in cases of misconduct or where misaligned incentives may cause material harm.
- Remuneration Principle 4: Severance pay – Payments to an MRT relating to the early termination of their employment contract should reflect that MRT’s performance and not reward failure or misconduct. A firm should set out in its remuneration policies and practices whether severance payments may be paid, and any maximum amount or criteria for determining the amount.
- Remuneration Principle 5: Deferral – A firm would decide whether a policy on the deferral of variable remuneration for MRTs should apply. An alternative “threshold-based approach” for deferral rules has also been considered by the FCA (where the rules would automatically apply above certain thresholds / with a minimum deferral period) but the “non-mandatory” approach is its preferred option.
- Remuneration Principle 6: Performance adjustments – Performance adjustment mechanisms such as malus or clawback will no longer be mandatory. A firm’s management body will decide whether it would be appropriate to establish and implement performance adjustment mechanisms (e.g., reductions, malus, clawback) in relation to the variable remuneration of MRTs where outcomes are inconsistent with the firm’s expectations on conduct, compliance or risk management.
3. Lighter governance and reporting: The mandatory requirements to establish a remuneration committee and to carry out a formal annual remuneration review would be removed under the New Code. Firms may keep their existing remuneration committees and must still review their policies periodically (SYSC 19AA.2.4R). For MIFIDPRU investment firms, the MIF008 remuneration report (SUP 16 Annex 51) and the remuneration disclosures in MIFIDPRU 8.6 would be deleted. Firms would still be expected to keep clear records of their remuneration policies and practices, in line with SYSC 9.
Next Steps:
- The FCA expects to publish a policy statement in Q1 2027, with the new remuneration rules and related guidance coming into force the day after publication of the policy statement. The New Code would apply to performance periods beginning on or after commencement.
- For AIFMs, and to align with the wider UK AIFM reforms, the New Code would apply in two stages: initially to full-scope UK AIFMs from the commencement date, and subsequently to medium and large UK AIFMs once the UK AIFM reforms take effect.
3. Preparing for the New Transaction Reporting Regime
On 2 October 2026, the FCA published Consultation Paper CP26/34, “Preparing for the new transaction reporting regime” (“CP26/34”).5 Alongside the intended repeal by HM Treasury (“HMT”) of the UK MiFIR transaction reporting legislation, the FCA’s replacement rules in MAR 13, MAR 14 and MAR 156, as outlined in Policy Statement PS26/15, “Improving the UK transaction reporting regime” (“PS26/15”)7, will come into force on 3 April 2028.
CP26/34 consults on three strands: (i) transposing the transaction reporting, instrument reference data and record-keeping “Level 3 materials” into a new Transaction Reporting User Pack; (ii) transitional provisions bridging the two regimes; and (iii) consequential amendments to the FCA Handbook and technical standards.
The proposals target investment firms, trading venue operators, approved reporting mechanisms and others submitting transaction reports, instrument reference data and order book data.
Key Takeaways from CP26/34:
- A single source of guidance: The new Transaction Reporting User Pack will consolidate guidance, clarifications and examples in one place. From 3 April 2028, it will replace the inherited EU non-legislative materials, which the FCA will then withdraw. Firms should continue to rely on them until then.
- Client indicator and single-sided reporting: MAR 14 fields 8 and 17 (client indicator for the buyer and seller) replace RTS 228 fields 8 and 17 (country of the branch for the buyer and seller), assessed from the executing entity’s perspective. Guidance is also given on conditional single-sided reporting, which allows one of two transaction reporting firms to report, provided that a pre-existing written agreement sets out, at a minimum, the time limit for the information required under MAR 14.10.2R.
- Derivatives: Because “long” and “short” positions are understood unevenly across asset classes, the test is framed around changes in economic exposure, extending to OTC derivatives priced in “payer” and “receiver” terms. New contracts, notional increases and decreases, and partial and full terminations are all covered.
- Branch execution: Consistent with Market Watch 709, UK branch attribution does not turn solely on a trader’s location. Instead, firms must consider the surrounding supervisory, governance and operational arrangements, and must report client details even where the relationship sits with a non-UK branch.
- Equity swaps and packages: Field 31 (Price) for equity swaps takes the reference price of the direct underlying instrument, not the spread on the financing rate. Index-based transactions may be reported voluntarily even where the index holds no reportable instruments (MAR 14.5.5G(3)). Package transactions replace “complex trades” and need neither a single price nor simultaneous execution. Where none can be derived, “NOAP” should be reported. Sub-sections 5.35.7 (Swaps) and 5.35.9 (Complex trades) of the ESMA Guidelines will not be carried across.
- Transition and corrections: New transitional provisions in MAR TP 5 would apply to transaction reporting firms and operators of qualifying trading venues. Transactions executed between 00:00 UTC on 31 March 2028 and 23:59 UTC on 2 April 2028 may be reported under UK MiFIR before 3 April 2028; those reported on or after that date must use the MAR 14 format and are deemed compliant with the requirements in effect at execution. The same applies to instrument reference data and Article 26(5) UK MiFIR reports by qualifying trading venues. Pre-implementation records need not be reformatted into MAR 13 format, but corrections submitted on or after 3 April 2028 must comply fully with MAR 13, MAR 14 and MAR 15.
- Scope: PS26/15 narrowed the regime to instruments tradeable on UK trading venues. Subject to HMT amending the legislation, the FCA may remove EU-only instruments from FCA FIRDS before 3 April 2028. The consequential amendments to the Glossary, COBS, MAR, REC, SYSC and technical standards are mechanical in nature.
Next Steps:
- Responses to CP26/34 are due by 6 November 2026.
- The FCA will consult separately on the new Transaction Reporting User Pack in Q1 2027 and publish the final version by 3 April 2027.
- The regime takes effect on 3 April 2028, when FCA systems switch to the new schema and validation rules, and UK MiFIR formats will no longer be accepted.
For further information on PS26/15, please see our earlier client alert here.
4. Fair Redemption Terms for Authorised Funds Investing in Illiquid Assets
On 8 October 2026, the FCA published Consultation Paper CP26/35, “Fair redemption terms for authorised funds investing in illiquid assets” (“CP26/35”).10 It proposes that non-UCITS retail schemes (“NURS”) that invest predominantly in illiquid assets (i) deal for redemptions no more frequently than monthly and (ii) apply a minimum 90-day notice period, so that redemption terms reflect the time typically needed to sell illiquid assets (e.g., real estate).
The driver of the proposed measures is a liquidity mismatch. A NURS invested mainly in illiquid assets but dealing daily, or without a notice period, offers investors liquidity that the NURS’ portfolio cannot necessarily support. The FCA consulted on similar proposals for property funds in 2020 but ultimately did not proceed with them. CP26/35 goes further, covering all inherently illiquid assets rather than only real estate.11
The substantive proposals are limited to NURS. They apply to the authorised fund managers (“AFMs”) of NURS with at least 50% of scheme property in inherently illiquid assets (each, a “fund investing in inherently illiquid assets”, or “FIIA”).
Ancillary changes also concern AFMs of NURS that are funds of alternative investment funds (“FAIFs”), other NURS using limited redemption arrangements below that threshold, and AFMs of Long-Term Asset Funds (“LTAFs”) on revocation of redemption requests.12 LTAFs themselves are largely unaffected, as minimum redemption terms already apply to them. Nonetheless, a practical impact falls on NURS FAIFs invested in LTAF units, which would need FIIA-prescribed limited redemption arrangements once at least 50% of scheme property is held in inherently illiquid assets (COLL 5.7). Finally, qualified investor schemes (“QIS”) are out of the scope of the proposals for now.
Key Takeaways from CP26/35:
- Monthly dealing and a 90-day notice period: An AFM of a FIIA must not deal for redemptions or cancellations more than once a month, and the notice period must start at least 90 days before the relevant dealing day (proposed new COLL 6.2.19AR), mirroring the LTAF regime. These are minimum terms, so an AFM may go further, subject to a 185-day limit for paying redemption proceeds and a shortened 182-day valuation deadline (both extended to all NURS with limited redemption arrangements). Subscription frequency is unrestricted, though taking subscriptions more often than redemptions requires the fund to be valued at each subscription point.
- A wider FIIA definition: The carve-out for NURS already dealing less often than twice a month is removed, so FIIA status depends on portfolio composition alone. The definition of an “inherently illiquid asset” is amended: transferable securities held directly or through a NURS would be tested against the approved security rules in COLL 5.6.5R(1); a unit in an LTAF qualifies because of the minimum redemption terms which apply; and units in QIS, open-ended unregulated collective investment schemes and recognised schemes are captured where the scheme aims to invest at least 50% of scheme property in such assets. Moreover, the 3-month buffer is retained, so a hybrid fund that exceeds the 50% threshold has 3 months to bring the portfolio back within its intended allocations.
- Limited redemption arrangements are open to any NURS: Any NURS AFM may adopt limited redemption arrangements to better align the fund’s redemption policy with its investment strategy and liquidity profile (proposed new COLL 6.2.20AG).
- New risk warning and prospectus disclosure: The prescribed FIIA risk warning in COBS 4.5.16R and COBS 4.5A.17R would be updated to clarify that (i) investors will not receive their money until the end of the notice period, and (ii) they bear market risk during that period, so they may receive less than the value of their units at the time they requested the redemption. The updated warning would apply to all NURS with limited redemption arrangements, not just FIIAs. Prospectuses must also set out the usual period for payment of redemption proceeds, any notice period or cut-off, any deferral or limit and its effect, and that the notice period may be extended during a suspension (COLL 4.2.5R(17)(g)).
- No unitholder vote, but a year’s notice: Introducing FIIA-prescribed limited redemption arrangements constitutes a significant rather than a fundamental change, so no unitholder approval is needed (the FCA’s rationale is that the change is not the AFM’s choice). Nonetheless, existing investors must receive at least 1 year’s notice. Thereafter, any significant change unrelated to redemption terms requires at least 60 days’ notice plus the length of the notice period.
- Suspensions, deferrals and revocations: An AFM must accept redemption requests made after a suspension begins unless it has reasonable grounds to refuse, and suspended days count towards the notice period (proposed new COLL 7.2.1-AR). The guidance at COLL 7.2.2G(1B), which currently sets a lower threshold for suspension for FIIAs, is removed. The deferral power currently available to NURS FAIFs extends to all NURS with limited redemption arrangements, with deferral in the first instance to a valuation point at least 1 month later. Accepted requests would be irrevocable unless the AFM agrees and is satisfied that revocation would not prejudice other investors (proposed new COLL 6.2.16R(3B)). The same change applies to LTAFs (COLL 15.8.12R).
Implementation:
- New funds launched after the rules are made would be captured 6 months after that date.
- Existing NURS in scope of the FIIA regime under the amended definition would have a 2-year implementation period to amend their redemption terms, with at least 1 year’s notice to investors.
- Existing NURS brought into the FIIA regime for the first time would have to comply with the existing FIIA rules on AFM functions and depositary oversight after 1 year, but would not need to amend their redemption terms until the end of the 2-year period.
- NURS that already operate limited redemption arrangements, or are FAIFs but not FIIAs, are caught 6 months after the rules are made, with a further 6 months to comply.
Next Steps:
- CP26/35 closes for comment on 11 December 2026.
- The FCA will address the position for QIS in its second consultation on reform of the UK AIFM regime.
5. Modernising Payment Services Regulation Consultation
HMT’s consultation on “Modernising Payment Services Regulation” (the “Consultation”) closed on 6 October 2026. It sets out the government’s intentions for the future regulation of payment services and electronic money.
The Consultation addresses: (i) HMT’s approach to updating existing regulatory requirements; (ii) responses to new developments in payment services; and (iii) a durable regulatory framework for Open Banking.
Approach to updating existing regulatory requirements
The Payment Services Regulations 2017 (the “PSRs”) and the Electronic Money Regulations 2011 (the “EMRs”) form the backbone of the UK’s payment services regulatory framework. Their provisions cover: (i) the scope of regulated activity; (ii) authorisation and registration processes; (iii) prudential and safeguarding requirements; and (iv) enforcement.
HMT aims to ensure that the existing legislation is sufficiently modern to support innovation (e.g., in AI and blockchain technologies).
The Consultation proposes removing certain statutory requirements from the PSRs and EMRs and moving them into the FCA Handbook, so that responsibility for setting firm-facing requirements would rest with the FCA.
Core provisions would remain in legislation, including the perimeter for regulated payment services and key definitions (e.g., of electronic money), so as to maintain “appropriate certainty and clarity in the legislative framework”.
The Consultation seeks views on which requirements should remain in legislation and which should be delegated to the FCA, and whether existing provisions need updating.
Responding to new developments in payment services
The Consultation outlines key reform areas for the payment services regulatory framework:
Supporting tokenised payments: HMT identifies tokenised deposits and stablecoins as key opportunities.
- Tokenised deposits: The government favours regulating tokenised versions of financial instruments consistently with their traditional counterparts, based on the principle of “same risk, same regulatory outcome”. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Cryptoassets) Regulations 2026 (the “Cryptoasset Regulations”) ensure that tokenised deposits fall within the established legal definition of a deposit and are regulated accordingly.
- Stablecoins: HMT considers that stablecoins used for payment purposes should be subject to robust standards. Currently, they are not regulated for payment transactions, a gap the government intends to close by regulating the use of certain stablecoins for payments.
- Stablecoin issuance: Where a stablecoin is issued in the UK under the new Article 9M of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (the “RAO”) (introduced by the Cryptoasset Regulations), it will be treated as “money-like” for payment purposes and brought within the payments perimeter. The Consultation envisages HMT formally “recognising” the regulatory frameworks of certain overseas jurisdictions that provide similar outcomes.
- Overseas-issued stablecoins will be regulated through new intermediary activities (dealing in qualifying cryptoassets as principal or agent, or arranging deals in qualifying cryptoassets) introduced by the Cryptoasset Regulations.
- The government is also considering whether firms authorised as UK issuers of qualifying stablecoins should be able to provide relevant stablecoin payment services without additional permissions (as credit institutions currently can), subject to appropriate conditions.
- Safeguarding: The government’s view is that safeguarding UK-issued qualifying stablecoins should not fall within the cryptoasset safeguarding regime (as introduced into the RAO) where such safeguarding is carried on in the course of providing payment services. HMT proposes that the traditional payment services regime is the appropriate venue.
- Payment services framework for tokenised payments: The government proposes a single set of regulated payment activities for both tokenised and non-tokenised payments. Firms that are already authorised or registered would need to obtain a variation of their regulatory permissions to carry out payment services using tokenised payments; firms without existing payment services permissions would also need FCA authorisation.
Leading the world in agentic payments: The Consultation acknowledges that the PSRs pre-date the widespread use of AI and asks what adaptations the existing framework needs to support agentic payments (for example, in relation to authentication and consent provisions or liability requirements).
Managing sector risks: The Consultation discusses whether enhanced accountability for senior managers in the sector would support effective oversight and risk management.
Unlocking the future of Open Banking
- The Consultation explores modernising the legislative framework governing Open Banking – currently the PSRs and the Competition and Markets Authority’s Retail Banking Market Investigation Order 2017.
- Key proposals include: (i) establishing a new right of access to support variable recurring payments; (ii) allowing account servicing payment service providers to charge third-party firms for access currently provided free of charge; and (iii) making any broader legislative adjustments needed.
- Significantly, the government intends to provide the FCA with powers to regulate Open Banking under the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. This would enable the FCA, for example, to set guardrails for the pricing of Open Banking products and services.
Next Steps:
- The government has stated that the Consultation is part of an iterative process, and it will set out further implementation detail in due course.
6. Tokenisation in Wholesale Markets
On 14 September 2026, the FCA published “Feedback Statement: Tokenisation in Wholesale Financial Markets” (“FS26/1”)13, summarising industry responses to the FCA and the Bank of England’s joint Call for Input of May 2026 (the “Call for Input”)14 on the future of tokenisation in UK wholesale financial markets.
Respondents broadly welcomed the regulators’ proposed approach, supporting their technology-neutral, post-trade stance.
Tokenisation is the digital representation of assets using distributed ledger technology (“DLT”). The Call for Input outlined the UK authorities’ long-term vision for tokenisation in the UK’s wholesale markets, recognising that DLT could fundamentally reshape how securities are issued, traded and settled. It examined: (i) ways to improve collateral mobility and post-trade efficiency; (ii) how to clarify regulatory expectations across the market lifecycle; (iii) how to support equivalent treatment of tokenised and non-tokenised assets; and (iv) how to develop digital market infrastructure.
Key Takeaways from FS26/1:
- Post-trade and collateral: Respondents identified the use of tokenised collateral in post-trade processes (e.g., to secure trades) as critical. Respondents also favoured prioritising secondary markets and fixed income over primary issuance.
- Regulatory principles: Respondents supported technology neutrality (i.e., the regulators will not favour DLT over non-DLT solutions, or one type of DLT over another). The FCA also maintained that, while technology providers may supply underlying infrastructure, regulated activities (e.g., dealing, arranging and safeguarding) will continue to be carried on only by authorised firms. This reflects the position in the Call for Input that each regulated activity requires an identifiable responsible person.
- Custody of tokenised assets: Most respondents favoured a technology-neutral safeguarding regime broadly aligned with CASS 6 (Custody Rules), supplemented where relevant by requirements on security, controls and crypto-specific technology risks, so that tokenised assets would not face materially different requirements from traditional assets. The FCA confirmed that firms will be assessed under CASS 6.
Next Steps:
- The Bank of England will consult later this year on a supervisory statement and a discussion paper addressing central counterparties’ acceptance of tokenised collateral.
- The FCA will consult on rules for safeguarding relevant specified investment cryptoassets in the first half of 2027.
7. AI in Financial Services: Good Practice and Areas for Improvement
On 19 October 2026, the FCA published “AI in financial services: good practice and areas for improvement”.15 It draws on the FCA’s industry engagement, supervisory work and AI Lab initiatives (including AI Live Testing and the Supercharged Sandbox) to show what safe and responsible AI adoption looks like in practice.
The examples in this publication are grouped into three broad areas:
1. Consumer Duty and consumers in vulnerable circumstances: The FCA wants firms to deploy AI safely and responsibly, so that consumers experience the benefit while firms continue to meet their Consumer Duty obligations. Firms remain responsible for outcomes delivered through AI-supported tools. Good practice included:
- defining the consumer need and target market before deciding whether AI is the right tool;
- limiting chatbots to approved source material, with escalation to a person;
- keeping auditable records of prompts, outputs, model versions and escalation decisions; and
- letting consumers choose AI or non-AI support and switch channels without repeating information.
2. Governance and accountability: Firms need proportionate oversight, clear accountability and risk-based controls across the AI lifecycle. They are responsible for AI systems they develop, procure and deploy. Senior managers need not be technical specialists but must take reasonable steps to understand AI risks in their area. Good practice included:
- central AI bodies, such as data ethics committees or AI boards;
- simpler risk tiers built into existing governance (including at smaller firms);
- mapping AI responsibilities across senior management functions, with accountability from the design stage;
- role-specific training for senior managers, technical teams and human-in-the-loop staff; and
- registering AI agents in a central inventory that shows ownership, system and data access, and the controls that apply.
3. Operational resilience: Firms described how they keep their AI deployments resilient and cyber-secure. Mapping AI dependencies into resilience planning is, for example, a requirement for firms in scope of SYSC 15A. Firms are able to outsource AI services but remain responsible for them. Good practice included:
- making considered decisions on whether to host models on their own architecture or a third-party cloud;
- piloting lower-risk use cases and stress-testing tools before deployment;
- designing architecture that can operate with different providers, to reduce reliance on a single vendor;
- using contractual requirements to obtain notice of significant vendor model changes; and
- assessing suppliers’ use of AI as a routine part of procurement.
8. Senior Managers and Certification Regime Review
On 22 October 2026, the FCA published Consultation Paper “Senior Managers & Certification Regime Review: Phase 2” (“CP26/37”)16, which sets out a package of proposals to further streamline the Senior Managers & Certification Regime (the “SM&CR”). Concurrently, the Prudential Regulation Authority published its own Consultation Paper on reforming the SM&CR for dual-regulated firms, “Review of the Senior Managers and Certification Regime (SM&CR) – Phase 2” (“CP14/26”).17
To view all formatting for this article (eg, tables, footnotes), please access the original here.
This article first appeared on Lexology | Source


